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In the Utah Court of Appeals
GILLHAM ADVERTISING, INC.,
a Utah Corporation,

]
]

Plaintiff/Appellant ;
i
vs.
]
TIM WILLIAMS and SCOTT
ROCKWOOD,

Case No. 880398

]

Defendants/Respondents. ;

JURISDICTION STATEMENT
This court has jurisdiction for this appeal pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(h).

NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Respondents Tim Williams and Scott Rockwood
("Williams and Rockwood"), Defendants below, moved the
district court for summary judgment in accordance with Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56(c).

Respondents prevailed

and Appellant Gillham Advertising, Inc. ("Gillham"), Plaintiff
below, now appeals.
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
The only issues on appeal are whether the court
properly granted summary judgment and whether Williams and
Rockwood' were properly awarded costs for depositions.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Prior to March 26, 1987, Respondents Tim Williams and
Scott Rockwood ("Williams and Rockwood") were working for
Appellant Gillham Advertising, Inc. ("Gillham").

(R. 003 f4).

Both were employees at will, having never signed employment
agreements with Gillham or agreements not to compete.
(R. 080 1(4) . Moreover, although each were given "Vice
President" titles, neither were ever corporate officers.
(R. 227, see also Corporation Annual Reports attached as
Exhibits 1 and 2.1 ). During their employment with Appellant,
Williams and Rockwood worked on the KSL advertising account.
(R. 080 f5). KSL had never signed a contract with Gillham
agreeing to exclusively employ Gillham for its advertising
needs.

(R. 080 %7).
The undisputed testimony is that Williams and

Rockwood were hoping to buy the Gillham business.

1.

(R. 103).

The Corporation Annual Reports filed by Gillham for 1986 and 1987 were
attached as Exhibits A and B to Respondents' Reply to Plaintiff's
Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. These
reports were not included in the record on file with the District Court.
However, Respondents have moved to have the record supplemented to
include the two documents.

-2-

They were dissatisfied with Richardson's management
philosophy.

(R. 116-117).

They entered into negotiations

with Richardson to buy Gillham, but came to believe he was not
negotiating in good faith,

(R. 156). Richardson himself

admits that he had no intention of selling to Williams and
Rockwood alone.
employees.

(R. 118). He preferred to sell to all

(R. 114).

Williams and Rockwood decided to develop a plan on
their own time for their own business if they were not
successful in purchasing Gillham.

(R. 144-145).

They

prepared a "To Do" checklist (R. 165-166) which included items
which needed to be done prior to forming their own business.
Some of these items were eliminated, others were accomplished
on Williams and Rockwood's own time and some not attempted.
(R. 148, 153). When a copy of the "To Do" checklist was found
in the Gillham parking lot by a Gillham employee, Williams and
Rockwood were fired by Richardson.

(R. 121). After

Respondents were fired they formed their own advertising
agency called Williams and Rockwood Advertising.
f15).

(R. 082

They then presented a plan to KSL in an effort to

obtain some of KSL's advertising business.
effort was successful.

(R. 083 1118). The

(R. 083 119).

Despite the fact that under Utah law Williams and
Rockwood were free to make plans to form their own business on
their own time prior to their termination, Williams and
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Rockwood were sued by their prior employer based on alleged
misuse of "confidential business information."

(R. 002-

R. 007). In his deposition, the Plaintiff admitted that no
"confidential business information" had been misused.
f21, R. 109-110).

(R. 083

Defendants then promptly moved for summary

judgment which was granted.

(R. 248-249).

This appeal

followed.

ARGUMENT
Summary judgment is appropriate in cases where there
exists no genuine issue of material fact, and the movant is
entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.
of Civil Procedure Rule 56(c).

Utah Rules

The court below correctly

found that this case presented no issues of material fact
which would preclude summary judgment in favor of Williams and
Rockwood.

I.

APPELLANT'S CONCESSION THAT THERE HAS BEEN NO
MISUSE OF GILLHAM BUSINESS INFORMATION MAKES
SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR RESPONDENTS APPROPRIATE ON
ALL OF APPELLANT'S CLAIMS.
Appellant's complaint consists of four causes of

action.

In its First Cause of Action, Appellant alleges that

Respondents breached their employment duty by using Gillham's
business information to promote their own interests as a
separate business entity rather than the interests of their
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previous employer, Gillham Advertising, Inc.

(R. 004 f11).

The remaining three causes of action are varied allegations
that Williams and Rockwood misused "Gillham business
information" in forming their own business.

(R. 004 fll,

R. 005 115, R. 006 120, R. 007 125). Thus each of Appellant's
claims clearly rested on a fundamental premise that
Respondents had misused "Gillham business information".
Utah law allows an employee to use his general
knowledge, experience, memory and skill so long as he does not
use or disclose any of the secrets of his former employer.
Microbiological Resource Corp. v. Muna, 625 P.2d 690 (Utah
1981) citing Caiman Unfair Competition, Trademarks &
Monopolies, (3rd ed.), §§ 51.1 pp. 349-50; accord, Safeway
Stores v. Wilcox, 220 F.2d 661, 665 (10th Cir. 1955).

This

rule encourages competition while protecting the individual's
right to exploit his own skill and knowledge.

Microbiological

Resource Corp., 625 P.2d at 697. Thus before Appellant could
prevail on a claim for misuse of business information, he
would have had to prove that the information was secret or
confidential.
Appellant below did not simply fail to meet its
burden of showing that any information used was confidential,
but, in fact, unequivocally conceded that there had been no
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misuse of Gillham business information. 2

The information used

by Williams and Rockwood did not contain knowledge not
generally known; none involved communication under an express
or implied agreement l i m i t i n g t h e i r use; none q u a l i f i e d as
s e c r e t and none were acquired in any wrongful manner.

Because

a l l claims s e t forth in A p p e l l a n t ' s complaint were predicated

2.

Q:

Your obligation is to t e l l us the information which you
alleged has been misused, you have to describe i t . If
you don't have i t , under our i n t e r r o g a t o r i e s you had an
obligation to describe i t to us.

A:

Okay. If you have provided us with everything t h a t ' s
been taken, then there i s no Gillham business information

Q:

That has been --

A:

-- that has been misused.

(R. 102: Richardson Depo. 77:15-23).
Q:

But you cannot tell me right now a single piece of
Gillham business information that has been misused; is
that correct.

A:

That's correct.

(R. Ill: Richardson Depo. 65:6-9).
Q:

Every one of your contentions in your complaint is based
on misuse of, quote, "Gillham business information." We
have asked you to identify for us what is the Gillham
business information that you allege was misused.
In response to that, you've said you can't identify
it unless you know what Scott and Tim took. We have
given you everything that they took.
You now state that none of that is confidential --

A:

(Mr. Marsden, Plaintiff's attorney)
Correct.

(R. 109-110: Richardson Depo. 59:22-60:5).
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on the misuse of Gillham business information, those claims
were no longer viable once Appellant conceded no misuse of
information had taken place.

Thus it was entirely proper for

the trial court to grant summary judgment for Respondents.

II.

APPELLANT DID NOT RAISE ISSUES OF FACT WHICH
WOULD PRECLUDE SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
Appellant's brief sets forth an array of what it

terms "Controverted Facts." That is a misnomer.

As a general

rule, the facts themselves although in the main irrelevant are
not controverted.

Simply calling these facts "controverted/'

does not make them so and does not create an issue of fact on
which this court can reverse the lower court's grant of
summary judgment.

Appellant has also listed such facts out of

order chronologically to create the impression that Williams
and Rockwood solicited the KSL business before they were
fired.

They also have presented certain facts and record

citations out of context in order to create an inaccurate or
misleading impression.

Exhibit 3 addresses each allegedly

"controverted" fact individually to correct these
inaccuracies.
An issue of fact cannot be created by a bare
contention unsupported by the record.
Light, 609 P.2d 937 (Utah 1980).

-7-

Massey v. Utah Power &

Moreover when a

party moves for summary judgment, and t h a t motion i s supported
by a f f i d a v i t s ,

the opposing party must do more than simply

r e s t on i t s p l e a d i n g s .

Franklin Financial v. New Empire

Development Co.. 659 P.2d 1040, 1044 (Utah 1983)

(party

r e s i s t i n g Rule 56 summary judgment motion must f i l e

responsive

a f f i d a v i t s r a i s i n g f a c t u a l i s s u e s , or r i s k c o u r t ' s conclusion
t h a t no f a c t u a l i s s u e s e x i s t ) ; s e e a l s o , Busch Corp. v. S t a t e
Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 743 P.2d 1217 (Utah 1987).
Respondents f i l e d two a f f i d a v i t s in support of t h e i r
motion for summary judgment both containing Williams' and
Rockwood's a t t e s t a t i o n s t h a t :
While employed a t Gillham, I did not p e r s o n a l l y ,
nor did I p a r t i c i p a t e with anyone e l s e , in
p r e s e n t i n g a plan t o perform a d v e r t i s i n g
b u s i n e s s for KSL, Utah County Journal, D i g i t a l
Technology or any other c l i e n t of Gillham
Advertising.
(R. 075-076 f 4 , R. 082 f f l 6 - 1 7 , R. 167-168 f 4 ) .
Despite A p p e l l a n t ' s c o n t e n t i o n t h a t some kind of
f i d u c i a r y duty was breached, Appellant has not presented
evidence in support of t h a t c o n t e n t i o n .

In l i g h t of

Respondents' a f f i d a v i t s , Appellant could not simply r e s t on
a l l e g a t i o n s in i t s pleadings t o r e s i s t the summary judgment. 3

3.

Appellant did f i l e an a f f i d a v i t below referencing a page from Keith
H i l l ' s Day-Timer. (Keith H i l l was a former Gillham employee working for
KSL who was a l s o a friend of Respondents). However, Appellant offered
no explanation of the ambiguous n o t a t i o n nor did A p p e l l a n t ' s counsel
inquire about the entry in H i l l ' s d e p o s i t i o n . This unexplained notation
does not refute Williams' and Rockwood's unqualified testimony that they
did not s o l i c i t Gillham's c l i e n t s u n t i l a f t e r they had been terminated
or Keith H i l l ' s testimony that Respondents did not s o l i c i t KSL u n t i l
Footnote continued on next page.
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The u n d i s p u t e d f a c t s b e f o r e t h e t r i a l c o u r t were t h a t
W i l l i a m s and Rockwood, w h i l e s t i l l Gillham e m p l o y e e s , made
c e r t a i n preparatory e f f o r t s
agency.

Those e f f o r t s ,

f o r c r e a t i n g a new a d v e r t i s i n g

however, d i d n o t i n c l u d e

solicitation

of Gillham c l i e n t s or any a c t f o r b i d d e n by law.

III.

WILLIAMS AND ROCKWOOD DID NOT BREACH ANY DUTY
OWED TO GILLHAM.
As n o t e d a b o v e , a l l of A p p e l l a n t ' s c l a i m s were based

on m i s u s e o f Gillham b u s i n e s s i n f o r m a t i o n .

However,

when A p p e l l a n t became p a i n f u l l y aware t h a t no b u s i n e s s
i n f o r m a t i o n had been m i s u s e d ,

i t attempted t o breathe

i n t o i t s c o m p l a i n t by b a s i n g a c l a i m f o r b r e a c h of

life

fiduciary

d u t y on a p h r a s e c o n t a i n e d i n A p p e l l a n t ' s c o m p l a i n t t a k e n o u t
of c o n t e x t . 4

See P l a i n t i f f ' s P o i n t s and A u t h o r i t i e s

in

O p p o s i t i o n t o D e f e n d a n t s ' Motion f o r P a r t i a l Summary Judgment,
(R. 1 8 9 - 1 9 4 ) .

A p p e l l a n t ' s c o m p l a i n t makes o n l y a s i n g l e

r e f e r e n c e t o a b r e a c h o f f i d u c i a r y d u t y by W i l l i a m s and
Rockwood.

However, t h a t d u t y i s s p e c i f i c a l l y d e s c r i b e d a s

r e g a r d i n g " t h e i r b u s i n e s s c o n d u c t i n t h e u s e o f t h e Gillham

Footnote continued from previous page.
a f t e r they were f i r e d . H i l l Depo. p. 41 l i n e s 12-16 (R. 224), and
(R. 134-137).
4.

Appellant has once again employed s i m i l a r t a c t i c s in i t s appeal to t h i s
court. Appellant, in i t s b r i e f , attempts to conjure up a cause of
a c t i o n for " i n t e n t i o n a l interference with economic r e l a t i o n s . " Such a
claim i s conspicuously absent from both Appellant's complaint and the
record below. See d i s c u s s i o n infra at IV.
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business information."

(R. 006 119-20).

Even if Appellant's

complaint is interpreted as one for breach of fiduciary duty,
however, the trial court properly found that no such duty had
been breached.
A.

The Preliminary Efforts Of Williams And
Rockwood To Form A Competing Business Is
Conduct Permitted By Utah Law.

The law does not forbid an employee from organizing a
rival business while still employed by a potential competitor:
Even before the termination of his agency, [the
employee] is entitled to make arrangements to
compete except that he cannot properly use
confidential information peculiar to his
employer's business and acquired therein. Thus,
before the end of his employment, he can
properly purchase a rival business and upon
termination of his employment immediately
compete.
Restatement (Second of Agency), § 393 comment e (1958)
(emphasis added); see also Las Luminarias of the New Mexico
Council of the Blind v. Isengard. 92 N.M. 297, 587 P.2d 444
(1978); Mulei v. Jet Courier Service. Inc., 739 P.2d 889
(Colo. App. 1987).

Utah has adopted the Restatement approach

and further defines the right of the employee to include "the
right to advise customers of the fact that he is going to
quit; and that thereafter he will be working for a
competitor."

Crane Co. v. Dahle, 576 P.2d 870, 872 (Utah

1978).
The cases cited by Appellant do not support
Appellant's proposition that Williams and Rockwood violated
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any duty owed to Gillham because each case involved the
solicitation of an employee's clients and undermining of the
employer's business before the employment relationship ceased.
The defendants in Duane Jones Co, v. Burke, 306 N.Y.
172, 117 N.E.2d. 237 (N.Y, App. 1954), consisted of officers,
shareholders and employees of the plaintiff advertising
agency.

Those defendants met together and agreed to either

take over plaintiff's business or resign en masse and form a
competing agency.

When the president refused to sell the

company, defendants threatened to resign, telling him that the
plaintiff's customers had already been "presold'' on the
proposed new agency.

The evidence before the court was that

the president responded to the threat saying:

"'In other

words, you are standing there with a Colt .45, holding it at
my forehead, and there is not much I can do except give up?',
to which Hayes replied:

'Well, you can call it anything you

want, but that is what we are going to do.'" Duane Jones at
241.

The conduct which the court concluded was a breach of

the duty owed by employees, included concerted, blatant and
coercive solicitation of the plaintiff/employer's accounts for
a competing corporation while still in plaintiff's employ,
conduct which is reprehensible whether engaged in by officers,
directors or regular employees.
Similarly, the defendants in Hoaaan & Hall & Higgins,
Inc. v. Hall, 18 Utah 2d 3, 414 P.2d 89 (1966), while serving
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as directors and stockholders in the plaintiff corporation,
solicited clients away from the plaintiff for the corporation
they would be forming.

Defendant Hall admitted that while

still in plaintiff's employ he had contacted several of
plaintiff's accounts, informed them that both he and the other
defendant would be leaving and asked if the client would like
Mr. Hall to continue to service those accounts.

Id. at 91.

Defendants thereafter resigned and took the files for the
accounts they had solicited from plaintiff with them.

Like

the court in Duane Jones, the Hoaaan court also found
defendants liable to their former employer for their disloyal
conduct.
Duane Jones, Hoaaan and the instant case all involve
advertising agencies.
ends.

However, that is where the similarity

Williams and Rockwood were very interested in

purchasing the Gillham agency.

That interest was discussed

with Mr. Richardson after Mr. Richardson had already expressed
a desire to sell the agency to Gillham employees.
Depo. 100:17-21.

Richardson

Richardson was not coerced into

negotiations, but willingly engaged in those negotiation
efforts with Respondents.

When Williams and Rockwood became

concerned that Richardson was not negotiating in good faith,
Williams and Rockwood developed a contingency plan to create a
new agency in case their attempt to purchase Gillham failed.
However, according to Mr. Rockwood's testimony, Respondents'

-12-

"desire always was and still was to buy the agency."
(R. 160). The idea of creating a competing agency only came
to fruition when Respondents were fired, and Respondents had
no choice but to pursue their contingent plan.
Appellant has not presented this court or the court
below with a scintilla of evidence that Williams and Rockwood
solicited any Gillham accounts before leaving Gillham (let
alone the kind of mass solicitation involved in the cases
cited by Appellant).

Post-termination solicitation of Gillham

accounts, on the other hand, cannot constitute a violation of
any alleged duty.

Microbiological Research Corp., 625 P.2d at

700.5
B.

Respondents Owed No Duty To Gillham
Greater Than The Duty Of A Regular
Employee.

Appellant attempts t o s i d e s t e p Utah law—which
c l e a r l y allows employees t o a c t as Williams and Rockwood
did—by a l l e g i n g they were o f f i c e r s of t h e corporation owing a
f i d u c i a r y duty of l o y a l t y and good f a i t h .

The fact i s

Williams and Rockwood were not o f f i c e r s of t h e corporation.
They were given t i t l e s , but were never made p r i n c i p a l s of the

5.

The Mulei court refused
defendant s o l i c i t e d the
competing business, but
was fired. 739 P.2d a t

to find v i o l a t i o n of an employee's duty when the
former employer's customers for h i s new
did not actually begin competing u n t i l after he
893.
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corporation.

Moreover, even if they were officers, Appellant

has failed to establish that they breached any duty owed by
officers to a corporation.
1.

Williams and Rockwood were not
principals of Gillham.

Whether one is an officer owing a fiduciary duty is a
question of law to be determined by the law of the state of
incorporation.
1983).

Lewis v. Knutson, 699 F.2d 230, 235 (5th Cir.

Utah law defines officers of a corporation as follows:
The officers of a corporation shall consist of a
president, one or more vice-presidents as may be
prescribed by the bylaws, a secretary, and a
treasurer, each of whom shall be elected by the
board of directors at such time and in such
manner as may be prescribed by the bylaws. Such
other officers and assistant officers and agents
as may be deemed necessary may be elected or
appointed by the board of directors or chosen in
such other manner as may be prescribed by the
bylaws. Any two or more offices may be held by

6.

Q:

Did you hold any other positions with Gillham?

A:

I was also given the title of vice-president, but that
was a title that didn't have anything to do with being a
principal in the corporation.

Q:

What duties, if any, did it have?

A:

Make me feel good.

Q:

Anything other than that?

A:

Did not affect my responsibilities.

Q:

Did you ever sign documents as vice-president?

A:

No.

(R. 151), Rockwood Depo. 10:21-11:5.
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the same person, except the offices of president
and and secretary shall not be held by the same
person.
Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-45. The law then requires corporations
to list the names and addresses of all corporate officers in
its annual report filed with the Division of Corporations:
(1) Each domestic corporation and each foreign
corporation authorized to transact business in
this state shall file, within the time
prescribed by this chapter, an annual report
setting forth:
. . .

(d) the names and respective addresses of
the directors and officers of the corporation;
• • •

Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-121.
Pursuant to the above law, Gillham filed its
Corporation Annual Report in 1986 and 1987, both times listing
its only officers as: Lon Richardson, Jr., President; Ronald
W. Griffiths, Vice-President; Nancy Mower, Secretary; and Lon
Richardson, Jr., Treasurer.

See p. 2 note 1, supra.

The 1986

annual report was in effect the year the alleged actions took
place. Neither that report, nor the report for the following
year list either Respondent as a corporate officer.
evidence was before the lower court when it granted
Respondents' motion for summary judgment and was not
controverted by Appellant.
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This

2.

"Executive Officers" as defined by
insurance law are not officers for
purposes of finding a strict
fiduciary duty.

Appellant recognizes the weakness in its argument
that Williams and Rockwood were Gillham officers, and so,
attempts to create a fact issue as to whether Respondents
could be classified as "executive officers."

Such a position

is irrelevant to a discussion of whether Williams and Rockwood
owed a fiduciary duty to the company.
Appellant's brief is replete with insurance cases in
which the court is asked to determine whether an employee is
an executive officer for purposes of insurance coverage.

That

situation is not analogous to the one at bar, nor does it give
rise to an inference that such an "executive officer" owes a
fiduciary duty to its employer.

The public policy which lies

at the heart of insurance cases is fundamentally different
from the policy of holding an officer, shareholder or director
to a fiduciary duty.

A basic rule of insurance law is that

the insurance policy is always construed against the insurer
and in favor of the insured.

P. E. Ashton Co. v. Joyner. 17

Utah 2d 162, 406 P.2d 306 (Utah 1965); Metropolitan Property &
Liability Ins. Co. v. Finlayson, 751 P.2d 254 (Utah App.
1988) . That construction naturally leads to a broader
definition of what constitutes an "officer", which
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construction will affect whether coverage is found in the
case.
In contrast, the fiduciary duty is narrowly construed
to apply only to officers, directors, and shareholders of a
corporation.

3 Fletcher, Cyclopedia Corporations § 1011

(Perm. Ed. 1986); Lewis v. Knutson, 699 F.2d 230 (5th Cir.
1983) ; Fausett v. American Resources Management Corp., 542
F.Supp. 1234 (D. Utah 1982).
Appellant offers no authority in support of its
proposition that executive officers as defined in insurance
cases owe a fiduciary duty to a corporation similar to that
duty owed by directors and officers. Respondent, on the other
hand, does not suggest that employees owe no duty to the
employer, but that the duty of an employee is not the same as
the fiduciary duty owed by officers, directors, and
stockholders.
3.

"Key Employees" are not fiduciaries of a
corporation.

Alternatively, Appellant has argued that Williams and
Rockwood were "key employees" owing the same type of duty owed
by directors, shareholders and officers.

However, Appellant

has never offered this court or the court below any Utah law
which distinguishes between regular employees and so-called
"key employees" for the purpose of finding a fiduciary duty.
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Appellant offers only the case of Duane Jones Co, v.
Burke, 306 N.Y. 172, 117 N.E.2d 237 (N.Y.App. 1954) for the
proposition that even employees who are clearly not officers
of the corporation owe the same strict fiduciary duty to their
employer as do officers.

That case, however, does not suggest

that the duty owed by "key employees" is the same as the
fiduciary duty owed by officers and directors.

In fact, the

standard used by the court against which the defendants'
conduct was measured was "the standard required by the law of
one acting as an agent or employee of another."

Duane Jones

at 245 quoting Lamdin v. Broadway Surface Adv. Corp., 272 N.Y.
133, 138 5 N.E.2d 66, 67 (emphasis added).
C.

Williams And Rockwood's Conduct Was
Appropriate Even If They Were Officers of
Gillham.

Even if Williams and Rockwood were officers, their
conduct did not violate any duty owed to Gillham.

The duty of

an officer is defined as follows:
Concern for the integrity of the employment
relationship had led courts to establish a rule
that demands of a corporate officer or employee
an undivided and unselfish loyalty to the
corporation. (cites omitted)
There exists, however, an exception to this
general requirement of loyalty. Thus an
employee does not violate his duty of loyalty
when he merely organizes a corporation during
his employment to carry on a rival business
after the expiration of this term of employment,
(cites omitted)
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Las Luminarias, 587 P.2d at 449 (emphasis added); see also 3
Fletcher, Cyclopedia Corporations § 856 (Perm. Ed. 1986).
The "fiduciary" duty which Appellant seeks to impose
is nothing in short of involuntary servitude.

Under

Appellant's theory Williams and Rockwood could not investigate
other employment alternatives until after they were
terminated.

Such is clearly not the current state of the law.

See Microbiological Research Corp.. 625 P.2d at 700; Crane
Co., 576 P.2d at 872-873.
The decision of the trial court was in accordance
with well-settled Utah law and is not inconsistent with the
law of other jurisdictions.

In the face of undisputed facts

concerning Williams' and Rockwood's preparations to create a
new business while still in Appellant's employ, the court
properly found that there was no evidence of a breach of
fiduciary duty.

Williams and Rockwood admittedly took

preliminary steps to form their own advertising agency and
also informed an employee of one of Gillham's clients, who was
also their friend, of their prospects to buy Gillham or form
their own business.

However, Respondents never unequivocally

committed themselves to the alternate plan.

It is unclear

whether these plans would have even been consummated if
Respondents had not been summarily fired.

If Appellant has

been harmed, it has been by his own actions in firing these
admittedly valuable employees.
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Respondents' actions are permitted by Utah law which
allows an employee to prepare to compete with an employer
while still in his employ.

Moreover, although Utah law under

some circumstances, may forbid officers charged with fiduciary
obligations from engaging in conduct which undermines his
employer's business while still in his employ, the evidence
that Respondents did not engage in such conduct has gone
uncontested.

IV.

Summary judgment was appropriate.

APPELLANT HAS FAILED TO PLEAD OR OFFER EVIDENCE
IN SUPPORT OF ITS SUPPOSED CLAIM FOR
INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE WITH ECONOMIC
RELATIONS.
A.

This Tort Claim Was Not Before The Trial
Court And Is Not Properly Before This
Court.

Utah law is unmistakably clear on the point that
matters not raised in pleadings or addressed before the trial
court cannot be raised for first time on appeal.
Messer, 731 P.2d 488 (Utah 1986).

Lane v.

The Utah Supreme Court

states:
Orderly procedure, whose proper purpose is the
final settlement of controversies, requires that
a party must present his entire case and his
theory or theories of recovery to the trial
court; and having done so, he cannot thereafter
change to some different theory and thus attempt
to keep in motion a merry-go-round of
litigation.

-20-

Bundy v. Century Equipment Co,, 692 P.2d 754, 758 (Utah 1984),
cruotina Simpson v. General Motors Corp, , 24 Utah 2d 301, 303,
470 P.2d 399, 401 (1970).
Appellant ignores this fundamental concept in its
appeal.

Appellant's suggestion that a claim for intentional

interference with economic relations was raised below is
simply unsupported by the record.

All of the claims contained

in the complaint specifically seek redress for alleged harm
stemming from misuse of Gillham's confidential business
information.

Even if, by some stretch of the imagination,

this new claim could be implied from language contained in the
complaint, summary judgment would still be appropriate because
such a claim would, like all other claims in the complaint, be
based on alleged misuse of Gillham business information.
Appellant has already conceded that Williams and Rockwood have
not misused such information.

In light of that concession the

lower court appropriately dismissed all of Gillham7s claims.
The only other way this issue could possibly be
before this court is if it was presented in arguments below.
Neither Appellant's brief nor Williams' and Rockwood's briefs
on the motion for summary judgment make a single reference to
an allegation of intentional interference with prospective
economic relations.

Therefore it would be inappropriate to

reverse the decision of the lower court on a basis not before
it.
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B.

Respondents' Undisputed Conduct Was Not
Tortious,

Although the claim for intentional interference with
economic relations is not properly before this court the facts
in this case do not support such a claim in any event.

The

Utah Supreme Court first recognized the claim of intentional
interference with prospective economic advantage in Leigh
Furniture and Carpet Co, v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293 (Utah 1983).
In so doing, the court adopted the Oregon approach to the tort
which "require[s] the plaintiff to allege and prove more than
the prima-facie tort,"

Id. at 304.

The elements which must

be proven are:

Id.

(1)

that the defendant intentionally interfered
with the plaintiff's existing or potential
economic relations,

(2)

for an improper purpose or by improper
means,

(3)

causing injury to the plaintiff.

The court held that mere instances of aggressive, or even

abrasive tactics were not sufficient to show intentional
interference, but a three-and-one-half years prolonged course
of abusive conduct as was demonstrated in Leigh was
sufficient.
Appellant's brief fails to allege facts which, if
true, would support the elements of this tort.

The undisputed

facts upon which such a tort would be based are that Williams
and Rockwood solicited a single Gillham client after they were
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fired.

Such conduct is clearly permitted by Utah law and is

to be expected in a competitive society.

Mulei, 739 P.2d at

893-894 (interference with contracts terminable at will by
lawful means justified by privilege of lawful competition).
Justice Oaks differentiated the tort of intentional
interference with prospective economic advantage from
legitimate competition with this language:
[T]his alternative takes the long view of the
defendant's conduct, allowing objectionable
short-run purposes to be eclipsed by legitimate
long-range economic motivation. Otherwise, much
competitive commercial activity, such as a
businessman's efforts to forestall a competitor
in order to further his own long-range economic
interests, could become tortious. In the rough
and tumble of the marketplace, competitors
inevitably damage one another in the struggle
for personal advantage. The law offers no
remedy for those damages—even if
intentional—because they are an inevitable
byproduct of competition.
Leiah. 657 at 307.7
By a l l e g i n g t h a t Williams and Rockwood engaged in
conduct r i s i n g t o t h e l e v e l of t o r t i o u s i n t e r f e r e n c e with
economic r e l a t i o n s , Appellant asks t h i s court t o adopt a harsh
standard imposing t o r t l i a b i l i t y on i n d i v i d u a l s who f a i r l y
compete with former employers simply because they successfully
s o l i c i t c l i e n t e l e of t h a t former employer.

7.

Such a r e s u l t

Admittedly, Appellant was injured when KSL decided to hire Respondents'
advertising agency. However, that injury by i t s e l f will not give r i s e
to t o r t l i a b i l i t y when clearly there was no improper purpose or means
u t i l i z e d by the defendant.
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flies in the face of principles repeatedly established by the
Utah Supreme Court that any duty to a former employer ceases
after termination and those employees are free to compete with
their former employer.

Microbiological Research Corp., 62 5

P.2d at 695; Crane Co. v. Dahle, 576 P.2d 870, 872-873.

V.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY
JUDGMENT ON RESPONDENTS7 COUNTERCLAIM FOR THE
BONUS MONEY.
It is not clear on the face of Appellant's brief

whether it is appealing the trial court's award of the $4,000
unpaid bonus money to Mr. Rockwood.

Appellant makes no

mention of the court's decision on that issue until the
conclusion of the brief when it states that "the trial court
erred in awarding Rockwood the $4,000 bonus money" and asks
this court to reverse the district court's September 15 Order
granting summary judgment on Respondents' counterclaim.

Brief

at 45.
Reversal of the trial court's decision on that
counterclaim is inappropriate for two reasons.

First, nowhere

in Appellant's brief does Appellant offer any reasons as to
how the court's decision on that issue constitutes error.
Second, at the hearing before the trial court on the motion
for summary judgment, Appellant's attorney conceded that Mr.
Rockwood was entitled to the bonus money and agreed to pay the
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full amount remaining due.8

The trial court accordingly ruled

in Respondents' favor on the counterclaim from the bench.
order was entered three days later.

The

Appellant then paid the

bonus money to Mr. Rockwood on November 10, 1988.

Appellant

cannot now retract from that concession and ask this court to
find error.

For those reasons, the September 15 Order should

be affirmed.

VI.

DEPOSITION COSTS WERE APPROPRIATELY AWARDED TO
WILLIAMS AND ROCKWOOD.
Appellant correctly states the standard governing

entitlement to costs for depositions, but incorrectly applies
that standard to the case at bar.

The Utah law in that regard

is that costs for depositions will not be awarded unless those
depositions are necessary to the party's presentation of the
case.

Nelson v. Newman, 583 P.2d 601 (Utah 1978).
Further, the determination as to whether those

depositions were necessary is committed to the discretion of
the trial judge.

Highland Construction Co. v. Union Pacific

Railroad Co., 683 P.2d 1042, 1051 (Utah 1984).

A finding of

necessity does not require actual use of those depositions at
a full-blown trial.

In fact, use of the depositions to

support a party's motion for summary judgment will suffice.

8.

This concession was undoubtedly based on Mr. Richardson's testimony that
he had not paid the bonus because he had "forgotten to do so."
(R. 119).
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Roy v, Neibauer. 623 P.2d 555 (Mont. 1981).

Appellant's

suggestion that costs should not have been awarded because
there was no trial is absurd.
Appellant does not contend that the depositions were
unnecessary to Williams' and Rockwood's motion for summary
judgment.

In fact the record will indicate how extensively

Respondent relied on those depositions in presenting its case
to the court.
Appellant also argues that the costs of the
deposition transcripts should not be awarded because discovery
through interrogatories would have been less expensive.

What

Appellant fails to mention is that all but one of the
depositions was taken at Appellant's request—as Appellant's
chosen method of discovery.

Williams and Rockwood should not

be forced to give up the costs awarded simply because
Appellant selected an expensive method of discovery.
Clearly the district judge did not abuse his
discretion in awarding costs of deposition transcripts to
Williams and Rockwood.

This court should, therefore, uphold

the district judge's decision in that regard.
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CONCLUSION
This lawsuit began as a series of claims against
Williams and Rockwood for alleged misuses of Gillham business
information.

When it became clear that no such information

had been misused, Williams and Rockwood immediately moved for
summary judgment.

This precipitated a change of tactics by

Gillham, and, in response to the motion for summary judgment,
Gillham raised a claim for breach of a fiduciary duty.
However the trial court granted the motion by Williams and
Rockwood finding no dispute of material fact as to both the
four claims raised in the complaint and the breach of
fiduciary duty claim raised in response to the motion for
summary judgment.
Gillham has once again employed the same tactics in
its appeal to this court.

For the first time Gillham has

alleged intentional interference with economic relations
despite the fact that no such claim was before the trial
court.

This transparent attempt to breathe life into the

complaint on which summary judgment was properly granted
should not detain this court.
The court below properly granted summary judgment for
Respondents on all counts, including the counterclaim.
award of costs was also appropriate.

This court should

therefore, affirm the lower court's decisions.
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Tab 3

EXHIBIT 3

Uncontroverted Facts

Response

1.

Gillham is a Utah corporation
engaged in the advertising
business, having its principal
place of business in Salt Lake
City. [R. 002, 5 1; 079, 5 1]

1.

Respondents agree.

2.

Williams and Rockwood are
residents of Salt Lake County.
[R. 002, 55 2-3; 080, 5 2]

2.

£4.

3.

While with Gillham, Williams
and Rockwood worked on the KSL
advertising account. [R. 080,

3.

IdL

1 5]
4.

KSL had been a client of
Gillham's for 10 or 12 years
and, after First Security Bank,
was Gillham's largest account.
[R. 179, 55 10-11]

4.

Id.

5.

Keith Hill, a former Gillham
employee, was the KSL employee
in charge of KSL's advertising
accounts. [R. 080, 5 6; 081, 5
9]

5.

Id.

6.

Hill was a friend of both
Williams and Rockwood. [R.
081, 5 10]

6.

Id.

7.

While with Gillham, Williams
and Rockwood discussed with
Hill their plans to purchase
Gillham or form their own
business. [R. 081, 5 11]

7.

Id. Those discussions took
place on Respondents' own time.
[R. 081, 5 11 - also cited by
Appellant]

8.

While with Gillham, Williams
and Rockwood prepared a "To Do"
checklist of things to be done
to form their own business if
their negotiations to purchase
Gillham failed. [R. 082, 5
13]

8.

Id.

9.

In establishing their new
business entity, Williams and

9.

Appellant has already conceded
that any forms used by Williams

Rockwood reviewed and
incorporated certain forms from
Gillham. [R. 083, 1 20]

and Rockwood did not constitute
confidential business
information. [R. 083 J 21, R.
109, 110]

10. On March 27, 1987, after
Gillham discovered the "To Do"
checklist and discussed it with
Williams and Rockwood, Gillham
dismissed Williams and
Rockwood. [ 082, f 14]

10. This is not in dispute.

11. Soon thereafter, KSL
transferred its advertising
business from Gillham to
Williams and Rockwood. [R.
083, J 19]

11. Id.

12. In Count III of its Complaint,
Gillham alleges Williams and
Rockwood owed fiduciary duties
to Gillham which they breached,
thereby damaging Gillham. [R.
006, M 18-21]

12. Count III actually reads that
Williams and Rockwood "breached
said fiduciary duties in that
they failed to use the Gillham
Business Information in such a
manner as to benefit Gillham,
but rather breached their
fiduciary duties by using the
information and conducting
themselves in a manner to
benefit themselves individually
and the business entity of
Rockwood and Williams."
Complaint f 20. [R. 005, J 20]

Controverted Fact No. 1

1.

This is not a controverted
fact, but is a question of law.
Lewis v. Rnutson. 699 F.2d 230,
235 (5th Cir. 1983).

1.

Williams was not a principal of
the corporation but was an
officer by title only. [R. 227
see also argument re: fiduciary
duty.]

1.

Whether Williams and Rockwood
were key employees and officers
of Gillham or whether they were
ordinary employees.

Facts According to Gillham
1.

Williams was Senior VicePresident, supervisor, and
primary contact person at
Gillham on the First Security
accountf Gillham's largest
account, which it had serviced
for 35 years. In 1986,
Gillham"s annual gross billings
to First Security were about
$600,000 and amounted to about
40 percent of Gillham's income.
First Security left Gillham in
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March, 1987.
3-9]

[R. 178-179,

U

2.

As Vice-President and creative
art director, Rockwood was
responsible for Gillham's
entire creative department
consisting of two full-time
writers, four fill-time
artists, and regular free
lancers. [Deposition of Scott
Rockwood, p. 9, lines 5-18]

2.

Rockwood also was not a
principal of the corporation
but was a vice-president by
title only. Id.

3.

Williams and Rockwood did not
punch a time clock at Gillham.
They had tasks and deadlines
and worked until they were
done. Rockwood arrived at 8:00
a.m. or earlier and worked
until 6:00 p.m. or 8:00 p.m.
most nights, often working
through lunch. [Deposition of
Scott Rockwood, p. 61, line 15
to p. 62 line 9]

3.

Respondent does not contest
this fact, but simply points
out it is not relevant to the
issues before the court.

4.

For several months prior to
their termination, Williams and
Rockwood discussed with Lon
Richardson, Gillham's President
and principal shareholder, the
purchase of Gillham for about
$500,000 plus good will.
Williams and Rockwood wanted
control of Gillham in one (1)
year; Richardson wanted to
retain control for five (5)
years. [R. 179, U 12-16]

4.

Id.

5.

Williams recognized that
Richardson had discretion in
paying bonuses, depending on
Gillham's profits. In March,
1987, Richardson paid Williams
and Rockwood each $1,000 as a
bonus for 1986. [R. 179, ft
12-16]

5.

Appellant's citation to the
record does not support the
fact alleged. Moreover this
does not change the fact that
Mr. Richardson promised Mr.
Rockwood a $5000 "incentive
bonus." [R. 083-084 %% 22-25]

6.

Because Williams and Rockwood
felt their bonuses were too
small, in mid-March, 1987,
Williams prepared a "To Do"
checklist of things to
accomplish prior to their

6.

Williams states, In a portion
of the deposition referred to
by Appellant, that the bonus
issue was not the only
precipitating event for
Respondents' decision to plan
to create a competing
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departure from Gillham.
181, 55 28-31]

[R.

advertising agency. As to the
bonus issue he states "And I
would say that that might have
given us more motivation than
we had before. But I wouldn't
say that that was the event."
Williams Depo. 20:23-25.

Facts According to Williams and
Rockwood
1. Williams and Rockwood were
employed by Gillham as
employees at will. [R. 018, 5
4; 080, 5 4; 075, 55 2-3; 167,
11 2-3]

1. Although Williams and Rockwood
have taken the position set
forth opposite, Appellant's
organization of facts should
not be read to suggest that
Respondents do not agree at all
with the foregoing "Facts
According to Gillham." In
fact, as set forth above,
Respondents do agree with most
of the "Facts According to
Gillham" but only seek to add
the foregoing clarification.
Moreover, it should be noted
that Appellant has not taken
issue with the opposite "Facts
According to Williams and
Rockwood."

Controverted Fact No. 2
2.

Whether Williams and Rockwood,
while employees and officers of
Gillham, determined upon a
course of conduct which, when
subsequently carried out,
resulted in benefit to
themselves from the taking of
the KSL account from Gillham in
violation of fiduciary duties
of good faith and fair dealing
they owed Gillham.

Facts According to Gillham
In its Memorandum in Opposition
Summary Judgment, Gillham asserted
the following supplemental facts:
22. Defendants wanted the KSL
business and directly solicited
that business from Hill.
(Deposition of Rockwood, p. 26,
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22. Respondents admit this fact,
but with the clarification that

lines 13-15; p. 28, lines
23-25). [R. 180]

any and all solicitation of the
KSL business took place after
termination. Rockvood depo. p.
24, lines 3-13; p. 25, line 15
through p. 26, line 15;
affidavits of Williams and
Rockvood.

23. Defendants eventually got the

23. Not controverted and not
relevant.

KSL advertising business away
from Gillham. (Deposition of
Rockwood, p. 30, lines 5-9).
[R. 180]

24. Defendants, in leaving Gillham,
knew they had to talk to Hill
and present a plan to show
their interest in handling the
KSL business. (Deposition of
Williams, p. 23, lines 1-6).
[R. 180]

25. Defendants met with Hill prior
to their termination.
(Deposition of Rockwood, p. 18,
lines 23-25). They talked
about starting their own
business. (Deposition of
Rockwood, p. 19, lines 22-24;
Deposition of Williams, p. 24,
lines 15-18). [R. 181]

26. Defendants talked to Keith Hill
and presented a plan.
(Deposition of Rockwood, p. 17,
lines 6-14). [R. 181]
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24. However, Respondents did not
present a plan to KSL until
after they were terminated.
[R. 075-076, R. 082 H 16-17,
R. 167-168]

25. Hill was a KSL employee acting
as the contact person with
Gillham. Hill depo. p. 13,
lines 17-23. The primary
purpose of his meetings with
Respondents was to discuss
KLS/Gillham business. Rockvood
depo. p. 18, lines 18-19. Utah
lav does not prohibit employees
from discussing future plans
vith the employer's clients.
These efforts vere made on
Respondents' own time. [R.
081, % 11] This fact remains
uncontroverted. Furthermore,
Appellant does not suggest that
Respondents tried to solicit
the KSL account prior to their
termination.
26. The solicitation did not take
place until after termination.
In fact, in Appellant's
citation to the deposition,
Appellant cuts off the excerpts
at the point the deponent (Mr.
Rockvood) makes it absolutely
clear that the solicitation did
not take place until after he
and Mr. Williams had been

terminated beginning where
Appellant left off:
Q. When did yo\i do that?
A. Directly talking to Keith
about these plans would have
probably been approximately
- well, one of the last days
of March or first of April.
Q. It was before your
termination or after?
A. It was after.
Q. You had had no discussions
with this prior to your
termination?
A. Define "this", what do you
mean by "this"?
Q. About this item of
presenting a plan.
A. Presenting a plan, no, we
had no discussions.
Rockwood depo. p. 17, lines
15-25. Keith Hill also says in
his deposition that Williams
and Rockwood did not present a
plan until after their
termination:
Q. Its your testimony that they
didn't present any plan to
you prior to March 26th?
A. No written plan.
Q. An oral plan?
A. Not to my recollection.
Hill depo. p. 41, lines 12-16.
[R. 224]
Prior to Defendants'
termination, they discussed
with Keith Hill if he would be
interested in joining their new
agency and he responded yes.
(Deposition of Hill, p. 38,
lines 12-15). [R. 181]

27. This fact is not relevant.

In mid-March, 1987, Tim
Williams prepared a "To Do"
checklist of things to
accomplish prior to Defendants
departure from Gillham.

28. This conduct is not relevant
because even if there were a
dispute as to whether the
conduct took place it is not
material to this action.
Moreover, it is uncontroverted
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(Deposition of Williams, p. 16,
lines 18-20). [R. 181]

that these efforts took place
on Respondents' own time. [R.
081 J 11]

29. The "To Do" checklist was
prepared prior to Defendants'
termination. (Deposition of
Rockwood, p. 16, lines 1-4).
[R. 181]

29. IsL.

30. The "To Do" checklist is in Tim
Williams handwriting.
(Deposition of Williams, p. 16,
line 17). [R. 181]

30. I<L

31. Defendants prepared the "To Do"
checklist because they felt
they were not fairly dealt with
in the 1986 bonus money Gillham
paid them in March, 1987.
(Deposition of Williams, p. 20,
lines 19-25). [R. 181]

31. See p. 4 \ 6 supra.

32. Some of the checklist items
were performed prior to
termination. (Deposition of
Rockwood, p. 16, line 18). [R.
181]

32. See f 30 supra.

33. Defendants crossed off the "To
Do" checklist items they had
accomplished. (Deposition of
Rockwood, p. 16, line 24). [R.
182]

33. Id. Respondents also crossed
items off the To Do list which
they decided not to do. [R.
221]

34. Defendants crossed off items on
the "To Do" checklist they in
fact had accomplished.
(Deposition of Williams, p. 26
line 18). [R. 182]

34. 14.

35. Defendants were following a
time table on the "To Do"
checklist. (Deposition of
Williams, p. 28, line 17). [R.
182]

35. Li.

36. Prior to their termination,
Defendants talked with Gene
Yates, a Gillham employee about
Defendants starting a new
business and asked Gene Yates
to come with them. (Deposition

36. Respondents did not ask Mr.
Yates to work for the agency
they were planning to create.
In fact, the portion of the
deposition quoted by Appellant
contains Mr. Rockwood's
statement that "We didn't make
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of Rockwood, p. 40, line 18; p.
41, line 12), [R. 182]

him an offer. . . . "
Depo. 41:10.

Rockwood

37. Defendants had contacted an
accountant for their new
business prior to their Gillham
termination. (Deposition of
Rockwood, p. 36, line 6 ) . [R.
182]

37. See 28, supra.

38. Defendants had obtained
stationery for their new
business and a logo prior to
their Gillham termination.
(Deposition of Rockwood, p. 38,
lines 5, 15). [R. 182]

38.

39. Defendants planned their
expenses prior to their Gillham
termination. (Deposition of
Rockwood, p. 44, lines 2-14).
[R. 182]

39. Id.

40. Defendants listed the Gillham
employee, Dave Bodie, on the
checklist as a potential
employee for Defendants' new
advertising agency.
(Deposition of Rockwood, p. 46,
lines 4-24). [R. 182-183]

40. Appellant has mischaracterized
Rockwood's deposition as to
this point. Mr. Bodie was not
on the checklist as a potential
employee for Respondent's new
agency, but, as Rockwood
explains in his deposition
immediately following the
portion quoted by Appellant,
was on the list because:

1^

A. He was one of the people
that we didn't feel would be
able to go into this
business with us.
Rockwood Depo. 47:4-5.
41. Defendants looked at office
space prior to their
termination. (Deposition of
Rockwood, p. 47, lines 10-15).
[R. 183]

41. Not relevant.

42. Defendants gathered
incorporation and bylaw
materials for their new
advertising agency prior to
their termination. (Deposition
of Rockwood, p. 48, lines
1-22). [R. 183]

42. Id,.
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See 28, supra.

43. Defendants copied a radio reel
and "Home Equity Loan Blues"
work produced at gillham prior
to their termination.
(Deposition of Rockwood, p. 49,
lines 13-25). [R. 183]

43. The type of information used or
copied by Respondents is not
relevant to this dispute
because Appellant has already
conceded that Respondents did
not use any confidential
business information. [R. 083
% 21, R. 109-110]

44. Defendants priced the cost of
telephones before their Gillham
termination. (Deposition of
Rockwood, p. 55, line 20). [R.
182]

44. Not relevant.

45. Lon Richardson showed
Defendants the "To Do"
checklist and it was obvious to
Richardson that Defendants
fully intended to leave Gillham
and were in the process of
doing so. (Deposition of
Richardson, p. 134, lines
20-25; p. 135, lines 1-3). [R.
183]

45. Id,.

46. Tim Williams and Scott Rockwood
held a number of closed-door
meetings in Tim Williams'
office prior to termination.
(Deposition of Richardson, p.
128, lines 22-23; deposition of
Rockwood, p. 60, lines 4-25).
[R. 183]

46. liu

48. Defendants prepared a written
business plan and financial
statement prior to their
termination. (Deposition of
Rockwood, p. 43, lines 19-23).
[R. 184]

48. Id.

49. Defendants prepared a budget to
submit to KSL for their new
advertising agency take over of
the KSL account prior to their
termination. (Deposition of
Williams, p. 28, line 25; p.
29, lines 1-6). [R. 184]

49. Appellant's structure of this
sentence may give rise to an
implication that Respondents
planned to submit the budget to
KSL before their termination.
In fact, Respondents did not
solicit KSL until after they
were terminated. [R. 075-076,
R. 082 11 16-17, R. 167-168]
This is ^incontroverted.
Moreover, the excerpt quoted

See 33, supra.

does not say that Respondents
did, in fact, prepare a KSL
budget, but only that they
"knew that if ve were to go
into business that as part of
the plan we presented to KSL
that ve would have to propose
budget." Williams Depo.
29:3-5.
55. Defendants began preparations
for their business presentation
materials known as "leave
behind" materials prior to
their termination. (Deposition
of Rockwood, p. 44, lines
15-25). [R. 185]

55. Sge 43, supra.

56. Prior to terminating
Defendants, Lon Richardson met
with Keith Hill's supervisor,
William Murdock, at the KSL
offices, and Keith Hill had
already told William Murdock
about the possibility of some
of Gillham's employees not
remaining with Gillham after
the loss of the First Security
Bank Account. (Deposition of
Richardson, p. 130, lines
16-20). [R. 185]

56. Not relevant.

57. Defendants told Lon Richardson
they were in the process of
doing the things that were on
the checklist and had done some
of them. (Deposition of
Richardson, p. 135, lines
10-14). [R. 185]

57. See 28, supra.

58. Lon Richardson reviewed the "To
Do" checklist and determined
that Defendants were planning
to start their own agency and
had begun the process.
(Deposition of Richardson, p.
127, lines 6-8). [R. 185]

58. IdL

59. Defendants told Lon Richardson
that the items that were
crossed off on the checklist
for the most part had been
done. (Deposition of

59. Id.
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Richardson, p. 136, lines 4-8).
[R. 186]
60. Tim Williams called Keith Hill
the morning following
Defendants' dismissal from
Gillham. (Deposition of Hill,
p. 21, lines 5-12). [R. 186]

60. Not relevant.

61. Defendants told Keith Hill they
were alarmed that Lon
Richardson had found the "To
Do" checklist; they were amazed
and it was a shocking situation
for them. (Deposition of Hill,
p. 24, lines 16-24). [R. 186]

61. li.

62. Defendants told Keith Hill that
Lon Richardson found the "To
Do" checklist containing items
Defendants were doing in
preparation for starting their
own advertising agency.
(Deposition of Hill, p. 22,
lines 2-6). [R. 186]

62. Id,.

63. Defendants asked Keith Hill if
he would be interested in them
providing service. (Deposition
of Hill, p. 23, lines 13-21).
[R. 186]

63. The conversation referred to
opposite took place after
Respondents had been
terminated. [R. 135-138] [See
also R. 075-076, R. 082 U
16-17, R. 167-168, R. 135-138]

64. Keith Hill's Day-Timer shows
that on Wednesday, March 25,
1987, he met with Tim and Scott
on an agency decision. Hill
indicated a "go but without
fuss of other agencies; OK on
high-end creative and a la
carte services." (Deposition
of Hill, p. 39, line 23; p. 41,
line 4; Affidavit of Milo S.
Marsden, Jr.). [R. 186]

64. Not relevant.

65. Keith Hill's Day-Timer
indicates that he met with the
Defendants on Saturday, March
28, 1987. (Deposition of Hill,
p. 40, lines 15-17). [R. 187]

65. See 60, supra.

66. Keith Hill decided to give the
KSL advertising work to
Defendants' new agency the

66. !£,.
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Saturday after the Defendants'
termination from Gillham.
(Deposition of Hill, p. 28,
lines 10-21). [R. 187]
70. Keith Hill's Day-Timer
indicates, "Lon fires Tim and
Scott" Thursday, March 26,
1987. (Deposition of Hill, p.
40, lines 4-11). [R. 187]

70. Not relevant.

71. William Murdock of KSL called
Lon Richardson in less than a
week after Defendants'
termination at Gillham and told
Lon Richardson that he had
decided to give the business to
Defendants. (Deposition of
Richardson, p. 153, lines
11-23). [R. 187]

71. The decision was made in
response to post-termination
solicitation. [R. 075-076, R.
082 %1 16-17, R. 167-168]

76. Defendants employ six full-time
employees; five of the six
full-time employees were former
Gillham employees. (Deposition
of Rockwood, page 12, line 11.)
[R. 188]

76. Not relevant.

77. Gillham received approximately
$200,000 in fees from KSL
during 1986. (Deposition of
Rockwood, p. 69, line 22; p.
70, line 3). [R. 188]

77. Not relevant.

78. Defendants' new agency received
approximately $120,000 from KSL
in 1987 for the months April
through December, 1987.
(Deposition of Rockwood, p. 70,
line 15). [R. 188]

78. Id.

See 60, supra.

Facts According to
Williams and Rockwood
In their Memorandum in Support of
Motion for Summary Judgment,
Williams and Rockwood assert as a
material fact:
11. Williams and Rockwood discussed
their plans to purchase Gillham
or form their own business with
Hill on their own time.
(Deposition of Rockwood, p. 22
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Respondents' assertion that
all activities and
preparation for their
competing advertising agency
took place on their own time
has not been contested by
Appellant.

at line 21; p. 23 at line 1;
Deposition of Williams, p. 23
at line 10-22; Deposition of
Hill, p. 20 at lines 3-12).
[R. 081]

AKl/PBHP
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